Subject-Matter Jurisdiction — Federal Question

MBEMax wiki article — paired with the Civil Procedure question set on mbemax.com.

One-line summary

Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (28 U.S.C. § 1331) — but the federal question must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, not as a defense.

Mnemonic

W-P-C — Well-Pleaded Complaint rule.

Say it like a weather forecast: "WPC today — federal skies only where the plaintiff's own claim sets them."

The rule (plain-language)

Under § 1331, federal-question jurisdiction exists when a federal cause of action appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Anticipated defenses or federal counterclaims do not create jurisdiction (Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley).

Well-pleaded complaint rule

• Federal law must be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action as affirmatively pleaded.
• Federal defenses (including preemption, Bill-of-Rights defenses, federal-law affirmative defenses) do NOT create jurisdiction.
• Declaratory-judgment twist: look to the underlying coercive action the declaratory defendant would bring.

Federal ingredient in a state-law claim (Grable doctrine)

Even when the plaintiff pleads a state-law claim, federal-question jurisdiction may exist when the state claim necessarily raises a federal issue that is actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disturbing the congressionally approved federal-state balance (Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering, 545 U.S. 308 (2005); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013)).

Four factors (all required):

1. Necessarily raised — federal issue is an essential element.
2. Actually disputed.
3. Substantial — important to the federal system as a whole, not just to the parties.
4. No disruption of the federal-state balance.

Amount in controversy

None required. Unlike diversity, § 1331 has no amount threshold.

Supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367)

• Covers claims so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy — i.e., share a common nucleus of operative fact (Gibbs).
• Court may decline when state claim raises novel/complex issue, predominates, all original claims dismissed, or exceptional circumstances.
• Does NOT apply the § 1367(b) plaintiff restrictions that limit diversity supplemental — those are diversity-only.

Removal (28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1447)

• Defendants may remove from state court if the case could have been originally filed in federal court.
• Federal-question removal — available regardless of defendants' citizenship. The § 1441(b)(2) "home state defendant" rule limits only diversity removal, not federal-question removal.
• All defendants must consent (rule of unanimity).
• 30-day window from receipt of initial pleading or amended pleading making the case removable.
• Non-removable actions: Federal Employers Liability Act, Jones Act, worker's compensation, certain state-law claims listed in § 1445.

NCBE loves to test

• Well-pleaded complaint trap. Plaintiff pleads a state-law breach of contract; defendant raises federal preemption defense. No § 1331 jurisdiction — federal law not in the plaintiff's claim.
• Declaratory-judgment inversion. Plaintiff seeks declaration of non-liability from a federal statute. Look at what the natural coercive suit would be; that's the claim analyzed.
• Grable substantiality. Empire Healthchoice v. McVeigh — reimbursement under federal plan raised federal issue but not "substantial" because case-specific.
• Implied federal cause of action. Most statutes today do NOT support implied rights of action (Alexander v. Sandoval). Don't assume a federal statute creates a private claim.
• Supplemental jurisdiction in federal-question cases. Broader than in diversity — full § 1367(a) reach; no § 1367(b) limits.
• Concurrent vs. exclusive jurisdiction. Many federal claims are concurrent with state courts (Title VII, § 1983). Some are exclusive (patent, bankruptcy, antitrust).

Fast hypos

Hypo 1. Plaintiff sues for breach of contract under state law. Defendant's answer says "preempted by ERISA." Plaintiff moves to amend to drop the federal issue. No § 1331 jurisdiction either way — not on face of complaint.

Hypo 2. Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unreasonable search. Federal-question jurisdiction — claim arises under federal law.

Hypo 3. Plaintiff sues to quiet title under state law, alleging federal tax-lien notice was defective under the Internal Revenue Code. Possible Grable jurisdiction — federal issue necessarily raised, disputed, substantial, and doesn't upset balance.

Hypo 4. Plaintiff sues in state court alleging patent infringement as a common-law claim. Removable/exclusive — 28 U.S.C. § 1338 gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims.

Case anchors

• Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) — well-pleaded complaint rule.
• Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering, 545 U.S. 308 (2005) — federal-ingredient test.
• Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) — four-factor Grable refinement.
• Empire Healthchoice Assurance v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006) — federal ingredient not substantial.
• Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) — narrow approach to implied rights of action.
• Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) — pre-Grable approach; still cited.

See also

• Subject-Matter Jurisdiction — Diversity
• Venue
• Personal Jurisdiction
• Erie Doctrine

Sources

U.S. Const. art. III; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338, 1367, 1441–1447; Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering, 545 U.S. 308 (2005); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).