Strict Liability

MBEMax wiki article — paired with the Torts question set on mbemax.com.

One-line summary

A defendant is strictly liable — no fault required — for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities, certain animal attacks, and (as a separate doctrine) for product defects reaching the consumer.

Mnemonic

A-A-P — Abnormally dangerous activities, Animals, Products liability (covered separately).

Think of the three As-and-P that defendants can't duck out of just by being careful.

Abnormally dangerous activities

Rule. Strict liability for foreseeable harm to persons, property, or land caused by an abnormally dangerous activity (Restatement (Third) §§ 20–24 — "abnormally dangerous activity": creates foreseeable and highly significant risk of harm even when reasonable care is exercised, and is not one of common usage).

Traditional Rylands v. Fletcher factors (Restatement Second § 520):

1. Existence of a high degree of risk;
2. Likelihood that the harm will be great;
3. Inability to eliminate risk by reasonable care;
4. Extent to which activity is not a matter of common usage;
5. Inappropriateness of the activity to the place;
6. Extent to which value to community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

Typical examples: blasting, storing explosives, fumigation, crop-dusting with toxic chemicals, transporting hazardous waste, keeping wild animals.

Scope of liability: only for harms that flow from the kind of danger that made the activity abnormally dangerous.

Animals

• Wild animals. Owner strictly liable for harm caused by dangerous propensities typical of the species, regardless of precautions.
• Domestic animals. Strict liability only if owner knew or should have known of the animal's dangerous propensities (the "one bite" rule, though modern statutes often impose strict liability for dog bites without prior notice).
• Trespassing livestock. Strict liability for reasonably foreseeable property damage while trespassing.

NCBE loves to test

• Scope of risk. Injury must fall within the type of risk that made the activity abnormally dangerous. Blasting protects against concussion injury; a dynamite-truck driver who hits a pedestrian while driving carelessly does not trigger strict liability for the collision (just ordinary negligence).
• Common usage. Driving a car is "common usage" even though dangerous; not abnormally dangerous.
• Comparative defenses. Contributory negligence usually is NOT a defense to strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Assumption of risk (true knowing, voluntary) and comparative fault in many states partially offset.
• Animal exception to foreseeability. Even for a wild animal securely caged, owner is liable to a non-trespasser injured by fright caused by the animal, under the theory of strict liability for species-typical danger.
• Trespasser limitation. Strict liability generally not owed to trespassers; a wild-animal owner typically owes trespassers only a duty to refrain from wanton injury.
• Products liability is separate. The "strict liability" label appears in both areas; keep the doctrines analytically distinct.

Fast hypos

Hypo 1. Dynamite blasting company vibrates nearby building, cracking foundation. Strict liability — blasting is abnormally dangerous; harm of type-risk.

Hypo 2. Fumigator's truck delivering chemicals loses its load when a deer runs into the road. Chemicals spill, damaging a neighbor's field. Negligence analysis, not strict liability — the injury flowed from a collision risk common to all trucks, not from the abnormally dangerous attribute of the fumigation chemicals when used.

Hypo 3. Defendant's tiger, securely caged, escapes during an earthquake and attacks a neighbor. Strict liability — species-typical dangerous propensity.

Hypo 4. Defendant owns a dog that has never shown aggression. Dog suddenly bites a guest. Common law: no strict liability absent prior notice. Modern dog-bite statute: owner strictly liable unless statutory exceptions (provocation, trespass) apply.

Defenses

• Assumption of risk — voluntarily encountering the known abnormally dangerous activity.
• Comparative fault — partial offset in many states.
• Act of God/unforeseeable intervening cause — may cut causation.

Case anchors

• Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) — foundational strict-liability case for escape of dangerous artificial conditions.
• Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11 (1969) — blasting is strictly liable.
• Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) — Posner: transportation of hazardous chemicals is not always abnormally dangerous; inquiry is fact-specific.
• Miller v. Civil Constructors, 651 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. 1995) — firearm discharge at commercial range; strict liability rejected.

See also

• Negligence
• Products Liability
• Nuisance

Sources

Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520, 506–509; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §§ 20–24; Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11 (1969); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).